But this runs into the perennial question of generalists versus specialists. Should counter-drone, or C-UAS, be a skill taught across the U.S. Army, with every soldier a potential asset for air defense? Or should C-UAS be assigned to highly trained specialists?
The service needs to create a specialized C-UAS Military Occupational Specialty, or MOS, argues one Army officer.
“Dedicated CUAS MOSs will focus on defensive operations by defending maneuver formations from enemy kinetic UAS [unmanned aerial systems] and ISR [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] assets,” wrote Capt. Peter Clifton in a September essay for the Army’s Air Defense Artillery Journal. “This will allow friendly formations to retain freedom of maneuver on the battlefield and prevent enemy UAS assets from detecting and reporting friendly positions.”
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Current C-UAS training is too generalized, according to Clifton, who is headquarters and headquarters detachment commander for the 110th Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion.
“The Joint CUAS course is generally an afterthought for training and pulls soldiers from their primary MOS responsibilities,” he wrote.
The problem isn’t that maneuver forces lack counter-drone capabilities. Units being deployed may receive anti-drone jammers, and personnel are expected to be proficient with their small arms, machine guns and anti-tank weapons, all of which can be used against drones. But assigning regular personnel to anti-drone work means “adding additional duties to a squad member in an already over tasked squad will severely degrade mission command from the company commander to the team leader,” as units will have less riflemen for engaging and destroying enemy forces, Clifton warned.
The Army itself admits that counter-drone training needs improvement. For example, a recent report by the Center for Army Lessons Learned revealed numerous problems during exercises at the National Training Center.
“The current training environment nearly always prioritizes maneuver, intelligence, and combined arms tactics, relegating C-UAS training to a secondary role where it is thrown in a corner and forgotten about, only reemerging when a critical event, such as a drone swarm overflight of a BN [battalion] HQ, reminds leaders of the importance of C-UAS,” the report warned. Units rotating through NTC suffer from a lack of standardized tactical standard operating procedures, “refined” battle drills and dedicated C-UAS planning and personnel, according to the report.
Other research suggests a C-UAS MOS would have challenges as well as benefits. On the plus side, C-UAS specialists would better integrate counter-drone capabilities into the maneuver forces, and allow for training that is more focused and can be continually updated, according to a 2023 study by the Center for Strategic and International Security think tank. However, a C-UAS MOS would also require more time and resources for training, and result in “potentially slower response time because only authorized C-UAS operators can counter threats.”
Ironically, one potential benefit of a counter-drone career field has nothing to do with drones. A C-UAS MOS might be a recruiting tool for attracting young people “with an affinity for technology and video games,” Clifton argued. “Recruits already predisposed to systems like the Xbox controller will lower the learning curve and make their training faster and more cost effective.”
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