Vern Evans
Less than two months after becoming the 29th Secretary of Defense, Pete Hegseth published an “Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance” memo, reflecting President Donald Trump’s desire to reshape U.S. defense strategy. It defines how the US military protects national security interests and shapes U.S. force structure, posture, war-fighting concepts and budget decisions.
The document replaces the Biden administration’s 2022 National Defense Strategy and marks a shift in Pentagon priorities under the new administration, offering an early look into what the second Trump administration’s “peace through strength” approach will mean in practice.
While the memo itself is classified, public reporting on the guidance tells us the reordered priorities for the Pentagon: China and homeland defense, followed by everything else. U.S. military departments and combatant commands must now adjust their strategies and resourcing accordingly. Congress and US allies and partners must also assess the memo’s implications — Congress for oversight and funding, and others to adapt their strategies in accordance with new Pentagon priorities.
Top priorities: homeland defense and China
While China was considered the main threat in the past two National Defense Strategies, it appears to be the singular overseas focus of the interim guidance. And aside from concerns regarding Chinese influence over the Panama Canal (and presumably the Western Hemisphere more broadly), the Indo-Pacific remains the primary overseas focus for the U.S. military.
The national objectives that underpinned the Biden and first Trump administrations — to protect the American people and expand economic prosperity —will likely remain. But the interim guidance signals a shift in how the administration perceives the strategic environment and the ways and means it will use to achieve its objectives. While the Biden administration focused on advancing democratic values to promote international stability, the Trump administration has emphasized peace through strength — the notion that military power helps ensure peace, a stance it now seeks to reaffirm.
The Biden administration’s 2022 NDS identified five major threats: China (the “pacing” threat), Russia (the “acute” threat), Iran, North Korea and violent extremist organizations — aligning with the first Trump administration. Biden’s team prioritized those threats regionally, placing the homeland first, followed by the Indo-Pacific, Europe and the Middle East.
This approach, a continuation of U.S. military strategy since the 1990s, is what a RAND study termed “expeditionary defense in depth.” It emphasized maintaining a sizable global posture and projecting power, i.e., deploying forces, across significant distances to crisis zones.
The 2025 interim guidance reverts to an earlier U.S. strategic approach suited for great power competition, what the same study calls “consolidated defense in depth.” Reports of the guidance indicate a shift from emphasizing the U.S. military’s ability to project power to crisis zones around the globe to a narrower prioritization on China and U.S. homeland defense. Previous strategies framed homeland defense around terrorism and overt military threats, but this guidance emphasizes holistic border security and protecting American interests in the Western Hemisphere, such as ensuring access to the Panama Canal and combatting cartels and transnational criminal organizations in Latin America.
The trade-offs: less focus on Europe and the Middle East
Every strategy involves trade-offs — prioritizing resources in one area means deprioritizing them elsewhere. The trade-off for a stronger U.S. focus on China and the Western Hemisphere in this guidance seems to be a diminished focus on Europe and the Middle East. Since the end of World War II, the United States has viewed a stable and peaceful Europe — composed of its closest like-minded allies and supported by a strong US role in NATO, security backing, training, and interoperability efforts — as strategically vital to its own security.
This imperative may now be shifting. While European allies and partners rely heavily on U.S. support against Russian aggression, the Trump administration expects them to carry the brunt of that burden moving forward, which this guidance reportedly affirms. The estimated median defense expenditure among European NATO members in 2024 was 2.1%. This stark reprioritization will send a clear signal to European allies — the United States will likely do less in Europe, so regional deterrence and defense will require strong European leadership, investment and modernization of their military forces. The Middle East, while less stable than Europe and with allies that are spending more on defense (Israel, 5.3% of GDP; Saudi Arabia, 7.1% of GDP; United Arab Emirates, 5.6% of GDP; etc.), is another region that will likely face reduced U.S. military focus.
Still, allies and partners should not believe that the United States will simply evacuate these regions. In some ways, the current trends might be thought of as a neo-Nixon Doctrine. As Nixon put it, this meant recognizing that “the United States will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends, but that America cannot … undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world.” The United States, according to this doctrine, would “help where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest.” The same is likely to hold true now — this strategic guidance likely means a reevaluation of how the United States supports and enables allies and partners, not abandonment.
A recent report in The Washington Post supports this assessment and further suggests that a Heritage Foundation report from last summer might be a major influence on the interim strategy. If these assumptions are true, then the United States will need to define where its involvement is uniquely necessary compared to what allies can handle independently, and, potentially, what it expects in return. Aligning Washington’s expectations for allied capabilities with the reality of where those allies currently stand may prove challenging.
4 crucial questions policymakers will need to answer
The DoD’s memo makes clear the reprioritization of its strategic threats and likely changes to how it will pursue its objectives. But it also raises crucial questions about what implementation will look like, what the Defense Department will ultimately ask of allies and partners, and how Congress can appropriate the funds to put these ambitions into practice.
First, what will “peace through strength” mean in practice?
This guidance offers a first glimpse. A key attribute appears to be close U.S. control over its most vital interests, especially in the Western Hemisphere — reminiscent of a modern Monroe Doctrine. The original 1823 doctrine warned competitors against meddling in the Western Hemisphere while asserting U.S. dominance and a policy of non-interference in return. It also signals a heightened focus on homeland defense — deterring threats and protecting U.S. citizens and critical infrastructure from foreign attacks — particularly through nuclear deterrence and missile defense, as seen in the Golden Dome for America initiative.
The Pentagon will also need to clarify where else it will invest to bolster homeland defense. Homeland defense can partially be achieved through strategic capabilities and border control — as reporting suggests the memo emphasizes — but threats to the homeland in the cyber and information spaces also abound. These are areas where the military can play a role, particularly in protecting critical infrastructure. If the administration intends to take a comprehensive approach to homeland defense, these aspects should also be considered. How the Defense Department clarifies its role, prioritization and resourcing of these areas will be important to watch in the coming months.
Second, how will this guidance translate into changes in U.S. force structure and posture?
For nearly a decade, the U.S. military prioritized developing forces to project power into the western Pacific to deter against a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. For years, U.S. leaders have argued for increased defense spending to create a military capable of fighting and winning in multiple theaters simultaneously. Several of those leaders — National Security Advisor Mike Waltz and Senator Roger Wicker, for example — are now in key positions to influence U.S. defense strategy and resourcing. There may be support for a version of the multiple theater force construct proposed by the congressionally mandated 2024 bipartisan Commission on the National Defense Strategy, with significant responsibilities for allies and partners.
But will an emphasis on China-first result in a strategy geared toward countering Chinese aggression and influence primarily in the Indo-Pacific region, or will forces and resources be geared toward countering China globally — across multiple regions and domains in which it is present? The answer to this will have significant implications for U.S. force structure and posture.
North America and Europe will potentially face the most dramatic shifts in U.S. force structure and posture. Building a Golden Dome and accelerating nuclear modernization will consume vast resources. Increasing U.S. shipbuilding, aircraft and munitions production will further add to the bill. Moreover, using conventional ground and special operations capabilities along the southern border will create more costs and readiness issues. Europe is likely where these trade-offs will be felt most.
European states and NATO should prepare for the U.S. military to act as an enabler rather than core provider of the bulk of any combat force. The United States can and should provide capabilities that European states will struggle to produce. Examples include command and control, space and cyber capabilities and bomber aircraft. However, Europe should expect to carry the burden for less unique military requirements, especially land combat roles. How this logic may translate to changes in American force posture in Europe is unclear, but experience from the last Trump administration suggests that some forces, especially land forces, may either withdraw from Europe or move out of Germany and Italy to posts farther east.
The Middle East may continue to receive military resources similar to its current levels, though there will likely be pressure for partners to assume leading roles where they can. To begin, the force posture there is small relative to what it was just fifteen years ago. secon, the renewed maximum pressure campaign on Iran coupled with Israel’s embroilment in several connected conflicts suggests that the administration will be unlikely to reduce support to Israel or Arab allies anytime soon. The desire to stabilize the region and pressure Iran back to the negotiating table are powerful imperatives to maintain commitments in the region. However, the United States may expect partners to do more. For example, European allies may be pressed to increase their presence in the Red Sea and assume more responsibility for common problems, such as countering the Houthi threat.
Third, what is the role of the military in securing the U.S. border?
While militaries are fundamentally tasked with securing a state against outside actors, the U.S. military has not focused on border security for over a century. Since the 1916 Mexican expedition, the United States has primarily secured itself by promoting stability abroad. As a result, border security shifted from a military role to a law enforcement function with defense undertones. A notable exception is air and missile defense, as seen in the combined US-Canadian North American Aerospace Defense Command.
A century of this strategy has shaped the U.S. military to project power overseas and defend the air and sea approaches to North America. U.S. leaders will need to decide if they want to transition border security back to the military or if using military forces on the border is a temporary measure. If it is permanent, how will border security affect the overall military force structure, especially of the Army? If it is temporary, what conditions are the troops at the border to create and how will those conditions be sustained by traditional border security elements once the troops depart?
Fourth, and most importantly, how will these changes be funded?
The interim guidance seems to represent a major shift in strategy, which requires a significant change in the associated resourcing strategy. Continuing resolutions will not allow this strategy to be realized. Given that fiscal year 2025 is almost half over and a 2026 budget is nowhere to be seen, congressional leaders will need to act with a sense of urgency not typically associated with the budgeting process if the Trump administration wants to see these major efforts take shape.
The interim guidance memo provides an early glimpse into the second Trump administration’s defense priorities. Clearly, the new administration has a different assessment of strategic threats and a distinct approach to ways and means compared to the previous administration. However, many details of how “peace through strength” will be implemented remain undefined — an unsurprising reality given the early days of the administration.
Nevertheless, with pressing security threats, it is critical to articulate these plans quickly. In the coming months, the administration will need to clarify how it plans to adjust U.S. force structure and posture, shift more security responsibilities to allies in Europe and the Middle East, and define the U.S. military’s role in border security. While much is still taking shape, this initial insight into the administration’s strategic thinking provides a foundation for Congress and U.S. allies and partners to begin adapting to the Defense Department’s shifting priorities.
Clementine Starling-Daniels is Director and Senior Fellow of the Forward Defense Program, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. Theresa Luetkefend is Assistant Director in the Forward Defense Program, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council.
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